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A COGNITIVE THEORY OF
FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIPS
Gregory S. Alexandert
Is there anything special or distinctive about fiduciary relationships? Or is the term "fiduciary" nothing more than a label that obscures rather than clarifies? Recently, several law-and-economics
scholars, building on the economic literature on agency costs, 1 have
argued that nothing categorically distinguishes fiduciary from nonfiduciary legal relationships. So-called fiduciary relationships, they argue, are nothing more or less than contractual relationships. Judge
Frank Easterbrook and Dean Daniel Fischel, for example, state that
"[fliduciary duties are not special duties; they have no moral footing;
they are the same sort of obligations, derived and enforced in the
same way, as other contractual undertakings." 2 While acknowledging
that " [ c]ases announcing fiduciary obligations teem with [moralizing]
language"3 of the kind Cardozo employed in his famous opinion in
Meinhard v. Salmon,4 Easterbrook and Fischel argue that, analytically,
fiduciary relations are just contractual arrangements with unusually
high transaction costs. This high-faluting rhetoric is just that-overblown rhetoric that obscures more than it illuminates.
The contractual approach to fiduciary relations makes a second,
more important claim. The claim is behavioral rather than strictly analytical. Contractarians argue that however courts may talk about fiduciary relations, they do not act that way. Courts apply the same
analysis to both fiduciary relationships and nonfiduciary contractual
relationships. The moralizing rhetoric that characterizes judicial
opinions involving alleged breaches of fiduciary duties has no substantive effect.
t Professor of Law, Cornell University. I am deeply grateful to my colleagues, Jeff
Rachlinski and Bob Hillman, for their invaluable comments and suggestions on this Essay.

In the interest of full disclosure, Rachlinski found more to agree with in this Essay than
Hillman did. Neither should be blamed for the blunders that doubtless remain here.
1 The seminal paper is, of course, Michael C.Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of
theFirm: ManagerialBehavior,Agency Costs and OwnershipStructure, 3J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
2 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. &
EcoN. 425, 427 (1993).

3 Id. at 428 n.6.
4 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) ("A trustee is held to something stricter than the
morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most
sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.").
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Several scholars have attacked the contractual deconstruction of
fiduciary relationships. At times employing economic analysis, they
have offered various theories of what analytically distinguishes fiduciary relationships from mere contractual relationships.5 This Essay
takes a different approach. Rather than challenging the analytical
point, I focus on the behavioral claim. Applying concepts and insights
from cognitive theory, which my colleagues Robert Hillman and Jef6
frey Rachlinski prefer to call behavioral decision theory (BDT), I offer the following hypothesis: Cognitive factors lead courts to analyze
fiduciary relationships, at least those that are property-based, 7 differently than they evaluate contractual relationships.
In cases involving alleged breaches of fiduciary duties, courts
tend to use a top-down mode of cognitive analysis; whereas in cases of
alleged contractual breaches, they employ a bottom-up cognitive
method. The difference between the two approaches is that top-down
processes are theory-driven or image-driven, which implies that the
analyst's own preconceived notions and expectations exert a heavy influence.8 Bottom-up processes, on the other hand, are data-driven
and therefore remain free from the influence of a preconceived theory of the situation. 9 The most important consequence of the difference between these two approaches is that courts are more likely to
hold fiduciaries liable for losses to beneficiaries than they are to hold
ordinary contracting parties liable for losses their counterparties may
experience.
The judicial tendency to apply top-down cognitive processes in
cases involving property fiduciaries stems principally from a cognitive
phenomenon called the schema. Legal scholars, including those
working in BDT, have thus far overlooked this phenomenon. A
schema is a cognitive bias that the psychological literature defines as
"a cognitive structure that represents knowledge about a concept or
type of stimulus, including its attributes and the relations among
5 See, e.g., Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND
AGENTS: THE STRuaruRE oF BUsNESS 55 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds.,
1985); Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor.An Analysis of Fidudary Obligation, 1988 DuKE
LJ. 879; J.C. Shepherd, Toward a Unified Concept ofFiduciaryRelationships,97 MOD. L. REv.

51 (1981).
6 See Robert A. Hillman, The Limits of Behavioral Decision Theory in Legal Analysis: The
Case of LiquidatedDamages, 85 CoRNELL L. REv. 717 (2000);JeffreyJ. Rachlinski, The "New"
Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 CoRNELL L. REv.
739 (2000).
7 I limit my claim to trustees and estate personal representatives-executors and administrators-for two reasons. First, these are the fiduciaries with whom I am most familiar. Second, the legal standards regulating these fiduciaries are more onerous than those
that apply to other fiduciaries.
8 See SUSAN T. FIsKE & SHE= E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNrION 98 (2d ed. 1991).
9

Seeid.
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those attributes."1 0 More simply, a schema is a fuzzy-edged, but still
relatively clear, preconceived image that the observer has of a particular situation or person.
This Essay hypothesizes that courts possess a fairly well-developed
schema of the fiduciary role, but have not developed a comparable
schema for ordinary contracting parties. The fiduciary role-schema
often makes courts more likely to over-interpret behavior of fiduciaries than in the case of conventional contracts. This attribution of
qualities to fiduciaries strongly influences how judges analyze the
causes of losses to beneficiaries. In some cases, the fiduciary schema
alone produces this attribution effect. In others, additional cognitive
biases that behavioral decision theorists have identified and analyzed
reinforce the schema. In the final Part of this Essay, I will discuss how
the fiduciary schema may work together with the well-known hindsight bias to expose fiduciaries to an unusually high risk of liability.
The hypothesis that I develop in this Essay is just that: an untested
hypothesis. It requires empirical testing, of course, before warranting
any strong claim of validity. But it seems to have sufficient plausibility
to merit consideration and, to whatever extent possible, further investigation. Testing the hypothesis would require more than comparisons of outcomes in reported cases involving alleged breaches of
fiduciary and nonfiduciary duties. Analysts would also need to compare settlement rates, levels of damages, and other factors. While
such an extensive analysis is not impossible, it would be complex and
expensive. Short of such comprehensive case testing, an experimental
form of testing might assist scholars in evaluating the hypothesis's
validity.
I have not engaged in either form of testing. In the final Part of
this Essay, I will discuss, both for purposes of illustration and as modest evidence of the hypothesis's plausibility, some recent cases involving fiduciary liability. These cases illustrate the effects of the fiduciary
schema in operation by itself and in tandem with other cognitive biases such as the hindsight bias. I fully recognize that the hypothesis's
validity ultimately depends on far more empirical work. Nevertheless,
introducing the hypothesis into the literature on fiduciary law, even in
its current tentative and rudimentary form, seems worthwhile in order
to encourage future testing.
I have also chosen to offer the hypothesis at this time to join my
colleagues Robert Hillman andJeffxey Rachlinski in the important debate concerning the value of cognitive theory to legal analysis. In discussing how the fiduciary concept operates as a cognitive schema, my
aim is to illustrate how cognitive theory can contribute to the develop10

Id.
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ment of a more complete positive theory ofjudicial behavior. In this
respect, while I share Professor Hillman's concerns that scholars may
be asking cognitive theory to do too much, I agree with Professor
Rachlinski's observation that "[t]he new law and psychology has begun to blaze a new trail and to inspire unique questions about law that
legal scholars would not otherwise have asked."'1 At a minimum, cognitive theory checks the excessively reductionist tendencies of many
law-and-economics scholars, including those who reduce all fiduciary
relationships to "mere" contracts. More fundamentally, cognitive theory offers the promise of a deeper, richer understanding of the behavior of legal actors. Such an understanding may have concrete
consequences for legal reform; and even if it does not impact the reform movement, it will be an intrinsically worthwhile endeavor.
I
SCHEMAs AND CAUsAL ATTRIBUTION IN COGNmIIVE THEORY

Recent work in cognitive theory has increasingly emphasized the
extent to which schemas influence our inferences and causal explanations.12 Schemas are knowledge structures that are comprised of assumptions, expectations, and generic prior understandings. We all
carry such prior knowledge around with us. People literally could not
function in society without ever relying on what they believe they already "know."
Where do schemas come from? Cognitive psychologists generally
agree that "[s]chemas develop from encounters with instances or
from abstracted communications of the schema's general characteristics." 13 Concrete experiences are perhaps the most obvious way in
which role schemas develop. A person's first encounter with a physician, for example, may generate a schema of doctors as caring and
attentive people. However, experience is not the only source of
schemas. What we learn or hear about particular roles or situations
frequently leads us to create strong expectations of persons occupying
those roles or participating in particular recurrent situations. For example, Americans learn at an early age that the first President, George
Washington, was a strong military leader and a decisive and trustworthy President. This image has likely formed the basis for a "presidential schema" for many Americans who expect their leader to possess
the positive qualities they associate with Washington.
11 Rachlinski, supra note 6,at 766.
12 See, e.g., KNNiHJ. GERGEN & MARY M. GERGEN, SOCLAL PSYCHOLOGY 46-47, 50 (2d
ed. 1986).
13 FhsxE & TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 147.
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Schema research has generated an extensive typology of
schemas.14 Fortunately, the type that psychologists have studied most
extensively-the so-called role schema-is the focus of my concern in
this Essay. The psychological literature defines a role schema as "the
cognitive structure that organizes one's knowledge about.. . appropriate behaviors."' 5 Some roles, such as gender, race, and age, are
ascribed, while others are achieved. I will focus on the latter type of
role schema here.
Schemas are neither inherently desirable nor undesirable; they
simply are. People have different behavioral expectations of others
depending on the others' role. For example, we expect a doctor to
behave in a warm yet professional way, while we expect a trial lawyer to
behave in an aggressive fashion.' 6 Usually, our schemas serve us well.
Generic knowledge, like the fact that a red traffic light mealis that it is
not safe to cross the street, is generally reliable and very useful. Other
schemas, however, may lead individuals to draw inaccurate or even
insidious causal conclusions. For example, many police departments
17
use racial profiles as the basis for whom to arrest.
All schemas, but especially role schemas, influence the encoding
of information. More importantly, they affect the inferences people
draw when they lack information. In this sense, schemas serve as information gap-fillers and frequently provide important efficiencies to
their users. At the same time, though, individuals are apt to overuse
and misapply schemas. 18 An increasing body of work in attribution
theory has focused on the misuse of schemas. Lee Ross and Craig
Anderson summarize attribution theory's approach this way: "[I] n the
perspective of attribution theory, people are intuitive psychologists
who seek to explain behavior and to draw inferences about actors and
about their social environments."' 9 As Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross
observe, "[t]he intuitive scientist [i.e., the ordinary person] is prone
to several major sources of error in causal analysis, including ...use
14

See generally id. at 117-21 (discussing person schemas, self-schemas, role schemas,

event schemas, and content-free schemas).
15 Id. at 119. For example, a role schema organizes one's knowledge about "behaviors
expected of a person in a particular social position." Id.
16 Role schemas are closely related to stereotypes. Indeed, as Fiske and Taylor noted,

"[o]ne can think about stereotypes as a particular kind of role schema that organizes people's expectations about other people who fall into certain social categories." Id.
17 See Eric Lichtblau, N.J. Agrees to End Race Profiling by Troopers, L.A. TiMEs, Dec. 23,
1999, at Al.
18 See RicHARD Nis=ar & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIALJUDGMENT 38 (1980).
19 Lee Ross & Craig A. Anderson, Shortcomings in the AttributionProcess: On the Origins

and Maintenance of Erroneous Social Assessments, in JUDGMENT UNDER
Tics AND BIAsEs 129, 129 (Daniel Eahneman et al. eds., 1982).

UNCERTAINT.
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of simplistic and 'overly parsimonious' criteria [e.g., schemas] for
causal attribution."

20

Reliance on stereotypes in causal explanations provides many examples of how schemas lead to erroneous attributions and causal explanations. To pick just one example, many people continue to
believe that the German people's innate aggressiveness caused World
Wars I and II. An even more insidious illustration, according to a stillprevalent line of racist thought, is the notion that African Americans'
aversion to work causes the higher ratio of poverty among African
Americans compared with white Americans. More prosaically, many
people believe that in a two-car accident, the driver of the larger or
more expensive car was responsible.
This last example prompts another important point regarding reliance on schemas in seeking causal explanations. Considerable data
indicate that social observers often go beyond constructing causal explanations and attribute blame to individuals.2 1 Pointing fingers is
most likely to occur when an easily identified source-commonly a
person-is readily available to blame.2 2 Moreover, as Susan Fiske and
Shelley Taylor explain, "[a]n attribution of blameworthiness is typically reserved for cases in which a causal agent is regarded as subject
to censure or punishment for a negative event."23 Blame-attribution
presupposes responsibility. When an agent who owes explicit duties
to her principal is available as a responsible causal explanation, people tend to assign blame to the agent.
One might suppose that schemas that repeatedly lead to mistaken
conclusions about cause and responsibility would gradually disappear
through a process akin to natural selection. Under such a theory, experience would lead people to distinguish over time between "bad"
and "good" schemas and abandon use of the former. In fact, cognitive research suggests otherwise. Researchers associate schemas with
the cognitive bias known as the conservatism bias. 24 This link implies
that schemas are strongly resistant to cognitive change. Indeed, the
evidence indicates that as people employ schemas more frequently,
they become more resilient to inconsistent evidence.2 5 If I have been
taught that priests are saintly men who do not indulge in the vices that
plague the rest of us sinners, I am not apt to reject or even amend this
prior knowledge when I encounter a priest who smokes, drinks alco20

NISB=r & Ross, supra note 18, at 114-15.

21

See FxsiE & TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 83-86.

22

See id. at 83.
Id. at 84.
24 See Ward Edwards, Conservatism in Human InformationProcessing,inJum
ourr UNDER
UNcERTAiN . HEur uscs AND BiAsEs, supra note 19, at 359, 359 ("An abundance of research has shown that human beings are conservative processors of fallible information.").
25 See NisBarr & Ross, supra note 18, at 146-50.
23
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hol, or tells off-color jokes. Rather, I am likely to regard this individual as a deviant from his role. Labeling him a deviant reinforces the
underlying schema.
Experimental research indicates that ego-involvement is a principal source of the conservatism bias.2 6 The ego, acting as an organizer
of knowledge, encodes and manages information in a highly selective
fashion that confirms what is already known. The ego acts to preserve
itself by protecting the integrity of its existing organization of knowledge. The conservatism bias to which ego-involvement contributes is
evident in a wide variety of common social practices, ranging from
Americans' resistance to adopting the metric system to refusals to admit errors in one's memory. The effect of this bias is that once the
ego has initially encoded and organized the knowledge, it tends to
strongly resist change.
Legal analysis is particularly vulnerable to schemas and other cognitive biases and heuristics.

27

At first blush, this observation may seem

counterintuitive. After all, in litigation, both sides must introduce
nonintuitive, bottom-up evidence to support their causal accounts,
and this evidence must meet particular standards of proof. Nevertheless, even these checking mechanisms are not sufficient to fully neutralize what Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky have called the
"anchoring" effects of schemas. 28 That is, decision makers have difficulty overcoming their initial schema-based judgment about a problem, even in the face of analytical or evidentiary challenges.
Recent work in attribution theory29 has emphasized the extent to
which schemas influence how observers of events identify and explain
the causes of those events.3 0 As Fiske and Taylor explain, "there is
now evidence that... when people are faced with a causally ambiguous situation.., they think through what they know about the causes
in that specific domain."3' 1 People tend to rely on particular categorical
schemas in making causal attributions rather than applying contentfree attributional principles. This reliance on categories leads lay observers to overattribute characteristics and dispositions to actors who
occupy those categorical positions. They draw particular inferences
about the actors involved in the events that they are trying to explain.
26 See Anthony G. Greenwald, The TotalitarianEgo: Fabricationand Revision of Personal
Histoy, 35 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 603, 603 (1980).
27 Here, I agree with Professor Hillman, whose paper makes this point effectively. See
Hillman, supra note 6, at 735-36.
28 Amos Tversky &Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:Heuristicsand Biases,
185 ScIENCE 1124, 1128 (1974) ("[Diifferent starting points yield different estimates, which
are biased toward the initial values. We call this phenomenon anchoring.").
29 See Ross & Anderson, supra note 19, at 129, 130.
30 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Causal Schemas in Judgments Under Uncertainty, inJUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAmNT. HEURSTICS AND BiAsEs, supra note 19, at 117, 125.
31 FIsKE & TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 60.
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These inferences, in turn, affect their causaljudgments. The ordinary
observer is apt to draw different conclusions about actors' responsibility for events according to the categorical role that the actors occupy.
One of the most important dimensions of role categorization is
the type of relationship between an actor and others with whom she
interacts. More accurately, socially created knowledge structures assign a relational type to someone who occupies a particular role. This
assignment strongly influences how lay analysts interpret that person's
responsibility for events with which she is associated. Knowledge
structures tend to assign relational roles according to hierarchical or
nonhierarchical categories. For example, friends, business partners,
and co-workers relate to each other nonhierarchically, which means
that they hold positions of relative equality of power and knowledge.
Doctor-patient, lawyer-client, and parent-child relationships, by contrast, tend to be hierarchically structured relationships in which one
party occupies a role of dominance and responsibility for the other.
The fact that collective schemas assign responsibility to the dominant role-occupant in hierarchically structured relationships strongly
influences how lay observers analyze questions of responsibility and
blame for bad events that happen to the subordinate role-occupant.
Lay observers are much more apt to assign blame to dominant roleoccupants in hierarchical relationships than they are to either roleoccupant in nonhierarchical relationships. Blaming the dominant
role-occupant is the default norm for hierarchical relationships. No
default norm exists for nonhierarchical relationships, so analysts resolve causation issues using data-driven, bottom-up analysis.
II
FIDuciARY RELATIONSHIPS, RoLE-ScHEmAs, AND
LiABInny ATTRIBUTION

The cognitive theory of role schemas may help explain how fiduciaries differ from ordinary contracting parties. Legal cognition associates fiduciaries with a distinct role schema. Lawyers and judges
explicitly learn to view the status of a fiduciary, especially a property
fiduciary, as a distinctive legal role. As such, they subject the fiduciary
relationship to more stringent legal norms than those they apply to
nonfiduciary legal roles. This training forms the basis for a schema of
fiduciaries that differs in important respects from schemas associated
with nonfiduciary contracting parties.
Legal training is not the only source of the trustee schema. Trustees themselves play an important role in its development. Two-hundred years ago, trustees were individuals with whom the trustor had a
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long-term personal relationship. 32 Today, the vast majority of trusts
are administered by large financial institutions, such as trust companies and trust developments of commercial banks. The shift from personal to institutional trustees created a need for literally trustinducing mechanisms. To encourage trustors to repose their trust in
large and impersonal institutions, the earliest trust companies began
the now-universal marketing practices through which trust companies
explicitly create a self-image of trustworthiness. These practices range
from adopting names like "Old Fidelity Trust Company" to advertising
strategies that emphasize the personal relationship between the company's trust officers and its clients. These practices bear a substantial
responsibility for developing both the extraordinarily high expectations that the legal system has of trustees and the concomitant risk
that those expectations will not be entirely fulfilled.
Legal doctrine reinforces those expectations. Conventional legal
doctrine depicts the relationship between fiduciaries and their beneficiaries as vertical, with the fiduciary occupying a dominant position of
power and responsibility. By contrast, traditional doctrine describes
nonfiduciary contracting parties' relationships as horizontal, where all
parties are equal and attend exclusively to their own interests. Admittedly, contract doctrine often distinguishes between different sorts of
transactions, 3 3 but the paradigmatic image of contract is a horizontal
relationship. Certainly, no one thinks that contract law systemically or
formally assigns contracting parties to dominant and subordinate roles.
Yet, that is precisely what fiduciary law does. Fiduciary law always defines the trustee or estate executor as the dominant party, who is systemically empowered over the subordinate beneficiary.
The difference between the horizontal and vertical relational
character of fiduciary and nonfiduciary roles leads to substantial differences in the duties that the law assigns to those roles; it also leads to
important differences in the ways in which courts determine whether
parties have fulfilled or breached those duties. For example, no one
talks about a duty of undivided loyalty between contracting parties.
Certainly, the good-faith obligation exists, but that obligation is substantially weaker than and qualitatively different from fiduciary law's
duty of loyalty. The typical judicial rhetoric explaining contract law's
good-faith duty speaks of "refrain [ing] from arbitrary or unreasonable
conduct" 34 and similar notions. 35 Indeed, courts do not universally
32

See generallyPeeringinto TrustIndustry Archives, 115 TR. & Esr. 452 (1976) (reviewing

the history of the modem trust business in the United States of the past 200 years).
33
For example, it distinguishes between merchant and consumer contracts.
34 Wilgus v. Salt Pond Inv. Co., 498 A.2d 151, 159 (Del. Ch. 1985).
35 See Hais v. Smith, 547 A.2d 986, 987 (D.C. 1988) ("This duty prevents a party from
evading the spirit of the contract by willfully rendering imperfect performance or interfering with the other party's performance."); Blank v. Chelmsford Ob/Gyn, P.C., 649 N.E.2d
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recognize the implied duties of good faith and fair dealing. In Texas,
for example, the courts refuse to imply covenants of good faith and
fair dealing in most contracts.3 6 In the contractual relationship, selfinterest is the name of the game for both parties. Claiming that contract law requires that either party act out of undivided loyalty to the
other party is laughable.
By contrast, fiduciary law's loyalty obligation requires that one
party completely subordinate self-interest and act exclusively for the
benefit of the other party. Unlike the contractual relationship, undivided loyalty is the heart of the fiduciary relationship, especially for
property fiduciaries like trustees and estate executors. Joel Dobris
and Stewart Sterk accurately express the legal profession's perception
of fiduciary duties: "Lawyers tend to see the primary fiduciary duty as
the duty of loyalty. A disloyal fiduciary is an anathema. 37 The picture
that emerges from the case law is that in contractual relationships the
duty is "don't screw the other side," but with regard to fiduciary relationships the demand to the fiduciary is "protect your beneficiary, not
yourself."38
Trust law has developed stringent rules to enforce the duty of
loyalty. Perhaps most notably, the no-further-inquiry rule triggers
strict liability in cases of trustee self-dealing. 3 9 Under this rule, a
trustee is liable for all losses to the trust regardless of whether she
acted reasonably or in good faith and regardless of whether her actions caused the losses. Although strict liability does not apply to instances of disloyalty other than self-dealing, judicial scrutiny is still
intense. Courts may hold trustees liable for even the appearance of a
conflict of interest.
The rationale for both the loyalty duty and the decidedly strict
approach to enforcing that duty rests in the vertical character of the
property fiduciary's relationship with the beneficiaries. The verticality
1102, 1105 (Mass. 1995) (stating that a covenant of good faith requires "'that neither party
shall do anything that will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other
party to receive the fruits of the contract" (quoting Anthony's Pier Four, Inc. v. HBC
Assocs., 583 N.E.2d 806 (Mass. 1991))); Sterling Capital Advisors, Inc. v. Herzog, 575
N.W.2d 121, 125 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) ("Minnesota law does, however, impose an implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing into every non-sales contract to prevent one party
from unjustifiably hindering the other party's performance of the contract.").
36 See English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex. 1983) ("To adopt the laudatory
sounding theory of 'good faith and fair dealing' would place a party under the onerous
threat of treble damages should he seek to compel his adversary to perform according to
the contract terms as agreed upon by the parties.").
37 JOEL C. DOBRIS & STEWART E. STEaK, RITCHIE, ALFORD & EFFLAND's ESTATES AND
TRUSTS: CAsEs ANm MA'Rmus 942 (1998).
38 I am indebted to my colleague, James Henderson, for sharing with me a collection
ofjudicial statements that reflect this difference in outlook.
39
See WAGGoNER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON WILLS,
TRUSTS, AND FuTuRE INTEREsrs 1222-25 (2d ed. 1997).
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of that relationship implies that a gross imbalance of power exists between the parties. One commentator expresses the conventional wisdom when he states that "the hallmark of a fiduciary relation is that
the relative legal positions are such that one party is at the mercy of
the other's discretion." 40 The legal literature consistently depicts
trustees as occupying positions of superior power and beneficiaries as
being vulnerable. This explains why judicial opinions in breach-oftrust cases are, as Dean Clark has pointed out, replete with moralizing
rhetoric. 41 Judge Easterbrook and Dean Fischel are correct in stating
that moral rhetoric is "a proposition about judges rather than about
rules,"42 but from a cognitive perspective it is judicial behavior that
matters. Rhetoric matters, too, precisely because it affects behavior.
The characteristic moral tone of judicial opinions about fiduciaries reflects the influence of a distinctive role-schema that judges associate with fiduciaries. Judges analyze claims of fiduciary liability in a
qualitatively different fashion than they analyze claims of contractual
liability. While they are more apt to use data-driven methods to decide ordinary contractual disputes, judges tend to rely on a particular
knowledge structure associated with the fiduciary role when dealing
with claims of fiduciary misfeasance. The relational verticality of the
fiduciary role strongly affects the content of that knowledge structure.
There are, of course, many vertical role relationships in society,
but the two that we are most likely to associate with the trustee-beneficiary or executor-beneficiary relationship are those between master
and servant 43 and between parent and child. Both the parent-child
and master-servant relationships involve structural power imbalances
that are directly analogous to trustee-beneficiary relationships. These
power imbalances result from two factors. First, the party in the
subordinate role tends to be passive and has only highly constrained
exit options. The effect of the power imbalance is that the relationship is rife with opportunities for abuse by the dominant role. Masters
and parents do not always abuse their charges, of course, but scholars
widely recognize that the roles are fraught with this risk. Second,
given the intimacy of the parent-child and master-servant relationships, abuses by the dominant role are difficult to detect. Courts' difficulty with discovering abuses highlights the need for more stringent

40
41
42

ErnestJ. Weinrib, The Fidudarj Obligation, 25 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 7 (1975).
See Clark, supra note 5, at 75-76.
Easterbrook & Fischel, supranote 2, at 434.

43 Mere employer-employee relationships do not constitute master-servant
relationships.

778

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:767

standards of liability to discourage those who might be tempted to
abuse their greater power.4
The structural similarity between the parent-child and master-servant relationships on the one hand and the fiduciary-beneficiary relationship on the other leads judges, as intuitive psychologists, to
associate the latter with the former. That association in turn affects
the inferences that judges draw about the fiduciary. Judges are not
neutral about what they expect from fiduciaries. The fiduciary's (perceived) power superiority, combined with the difficulty of actually detecting abuses of power, leads judges to draw inferences against
fiduciaries. Moreover, because fiduciaries, like parents and masters,
are expected to protect their charges when beneficiaries experience
losses, judges are apt to blame the responsible fiduciary. Consequently, judges will resolve questions of doubt against the fiduciary.
This mode of analysis differs substantially from courts' traditional
approach to alleged breach-of-contract cases. Because the contracting
parties' relationship is horizontal rather than vertical, they are normally assumed to be equally powerful and responsible only for themselves. 45 There is no a priori warrant for drawing inferences against
one side or the other. Consequently, analysis of disputes between
contracting parties must be more data-driven than in cases of beneficiary losses.
If my hypothesis regarding the influence of schemas in fiduciary
cases is correct, then we should expect greater accuracy in determining liability in judicial decisions on contract claims than on breach-offiduciary-duty claims. This discrepancy results because courts employ
a more data-driven mode of analysis in contract cases that is relatively
uninfluenced by knowledge structures like role-schemas. That is, actual evidence more frequently tends to warrant attribution of liability
in contract cases than in fiduciary cases.
III
Two ILLuSTRATvE CASES
A.

The Fiduciary Schema in Operation: In re Estate of Rothko

In order to illustrate the influence of the distinctive fiduciary
schema that I have described, I will briefly discuss a widely noted case
44 For a similar argument, see Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fidudary
Relationship: Its Economic Characterand Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1045, 1053-56,
1074 (1991).
45 This statement needs to be qualified to acknowledge differences among various
sorts of contracts. For example, courts are much more apt to treat merchant-merchant
contracts as relationships between equals than when they encounter merchant-consumer
contracts. Even in the case of merchant-consumer contracts, however, there is no systemic
assumption that the consumer is vulnerable or unable to protect her own interests.
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involving alleged breaches of the duty of loyalty. The case, Rothko v.
Reis (In re Estate of Rothko),4 6 attracted considerable attention not only
because it involved a famous artist's estate, but also because the three
courts that heard the case treated the fiduciaries quite harshly.
Three months after Mark Rothko's tragic death by suicide in
1970, the three coexecutors of his estate entered into two contracts
with a well-known art gallery, Marlborough, to deal with some 800
paintings remaining in the estate. 47 Rothko had personally selected
all three coexecutors, and his will expressly conferred on them the
power to sell his estate assets, including his paintings. 48 The first contract sold 100 paintings to the gallery for $1.8 million.49 The second
contract consigned the remaining 700 paintings to the gallery, to be
sold over twelve years at a fifty percent commission. 50
The trial court found that two of the executors, Bernard Reis and
Theodoros Stamos, had breached their duty of loyalty by entering into
these contracts. 5 1 The conflict of interest arose because Reis and Stamos were involved with the gallery in relationships that, according to
the court, benefitted them personally.5 2 Reis was an officer (but not
owner) of Marlborough, while Stamos was a "'not-too-successful artist"' whose work Marlborough later handled. 53 The court found that
the two men attempted to curry favor with the gallery by cutting deals
that were unusually favorable to the gallery and allowed the gallery to
earn substantial profits from resales of some of the paintings. 5 4 The
court held that the third executor, Morton Levine, was not guilty of
self-dealing, but acted negligently in failing to blow the whistle on his
two disloyal coexecutors. 5 5
The court voided the two contracts, ordered return of the unsold
paintings, and held the three coexecutors and the gallery jointly and
severally liable for approximately $6.5 million. 56 This amount repre57
sented the fair market value of the sold paintings at the time of sale.

In addition, the court held the two disloyal coexecutors and the gallery liable for an extra $2.8 million as "appreciation damages."5 8 This
46

372 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1977).

See id. at 293; Estate of Rothko, 379 N.Y.S.2d 923, 935 (Sur. Ct. 1975); Lee Seldes,
The Passion of Mark Rothko, ESQUIRE, Nov. 1974, at 118, 122.
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See 372 N.E.2d at 293.
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See id. at 294.
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Id. (quoting Estate of Rothko, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 941).
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represented the increase in the market value of the sold-and therefore unrecoverable-paintings between the time of sale and the time
of trial. The two disloyal fiduciaries were therefore liable for some
$9.2 million.
Both the New York Appellate Division and the New York Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's findings, including the amounts of
liability. 9 Writing for the Court of Appeals, Judge Cooke stated that
the court based its disloyalty findings on clear and strong evidence of
actual disloyalty that directly caused substantial losses to the estate
beneficiaries rather than on the strict liability no-further-inquiry
rule.60 As other commentators have noted, 6 1 though, it is hard to
square these conclusions with the facts. Vis-a-vis the gallery and the
two disloyal coexecutors, the $5.5 million award, which constituted
the amount actually realized from the resale of paintings, is conceivably justifiable on restitutionary grounds as disgorgement of actual
gain. However, it is impossible to justify that award as restitution
against the third coexecutor, who was not disloyal and in no way stood
to gain from the transactions with the gallery. In order to make sense
of the award as against the third coexecutor, we must assume that the
award represents causally connected compensatory damages. But that
theory works only if the executors owed a legal duty to delay sales of
the paintings. The trial court, however, made no finding that the timing of the sales was wrongful. More significantly, none of the three
courts that heard the case asked how loyal and nonnegligent executors would have handled the estate under the circumstances. By framing the issue that way, the court would have invoked a bottom-up,
data-driven mode of analysis.
Such an analysis would have disclosed several facts about which
all three courts were totally silent. In response to the estate's expert
witnesses, who contended that a more gradual plan of disposition was
appropriate, one might have pointed out that a loyal and nonnegligent executor had to anticipate tax liabilities in addition to satisfying
the decedent's cash bequests. Rothko's will made a cash bequest to
his wife of $250,000. The original estate tax return of the coexecutors
conceded a liability of $546,000; the IRS responded that the deficiency was $4.6 million. 62 On the other side of the ledger, the estate's
cash position at death was limited. Rothko had $330,000 in bank deposits and $1.1 million in receivables. 63 These figures alone suggest
59

See id. at 295, 300.

See id. at 296.
See, e.g., Richard V. Weilman, Punitive Surcharges Against Disloyal Fiduciaries-Is
Rothko Rightv, 77 MrcH. L. REv. 95, 100-01, 113-14, 117 (1978) (arguing that courts should
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that the coexecutors were probably justified in selling when they did
in order to improve the estate's liquidity to a level necessary to both
pay taxes and satisfy cash bequests.
Beyond that, a loyal and nonnegligent executor would have taken
other factors into account. As Richard Wellman aptly remarks, these
factors include
weigh [ing] the risks of retaining inventory in the hope that, because
of the stature of the artist and the quality of the paintings, its worth
would increase; consider[ing] whether cash or art best suited the
originally stated purpose of the residuary foundation to support deserving artists pending market acceptance of their works; and remember[ing] the conventional wisdom of fiduciary administration
that the fiduciary's first obligation is to conserve values which are
64
certain and to avoid speculation.
Again, the three courts' opinions were completely silent about all of
these considerations.
The trial court's opinion typified all three courts' mode of analysis. The trial judge, Surrogate Millard Midonick, attributed a number
of personal characteristics to the three coexecutors and focused especially on Bernard Reis. Reis and the others, Midonick asserted, were
predisposed to look for opportunities for personal gain. Since Reis
already had amassed a huge fortune, his gain was not financial.
Rather, Reis sought prestige or, as Midonick put it, "aggrandizement
of status." 65 Reis's position as executor enabled him to act on his ambition by cutting deals with Marlborough on terms that favored the
gallery at the expense of the estate.
Midonick's analysis was, in short, dispositional rather than situational. That is, his analysis reflected the belief that people like Reis
are motivated by individual proclivity rather than by responding to
situational circumstances that are pertinent to the actions they take at
a given moment. As Midonick's opinion demonstrates, dispositional
behavioral analysis encourages inferential leaps. Midonick reasoned
that because Reis was predisposed to engage in opportunistic behavior, his motive for entering into the two contracts with Marlborough
was strictly self-interested. Although Reis did not technically engage
in self-dealing, Midonick viewed Reis's self-interest as so gross that he
'66
labeled Reis's breach of loyalty "the equivalent of self-dealing.
Midonick's attributional inferences effectively precluded him from
conducting a detailed analysis of legitimate reasons that might have
motivated Reis to act as he did. As a result of foregoing such an inquiry, Midonick magnified the degree of disloyalty and consequently
64
65
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increased the size of the liability judgment. In sum, it seems that the
fiduciary role-schema exerted a greater influence on Midonick than
any comprehensive and neutral assessment of the immediate circumstances affecting the actor.
B.

The Fiduciary Schema and the Hindsight Bias

In some instances the fiduciary schema operates alone, while in
other situations it operates along with other cognitive phenomena. As
Professors Hillman and Rachlinski have clearly articulated, cognitive
psychologists have identified a wide array of cognitive errors that affect decisional processes. 67 Many of these errors are relevant to legal
decision makers, including courts and juries. 68 With respect to decisions about fiduciary liability, hindsight bias is the most prominent
cognitive error.
Numerous scholars have documented this bias and fully explained its relationship to law, 69 but I will nonetheless provide a brief
description here. Cognitive psychologists have described the hindsight bias as individuals' tendency to consistently exaggerate what, in
foresight, they could have anticipated. It is the persistent tendency of
people to believe that what they know ex post was eminently knowable
ex ante. Or, as one psychologist puts it, "[p]eople believe that others
should have been able to anticipate events much better than was actu70
ally the case."
The hindsight bias has obvious implications for property fiduciaries, especially trustees. Trust law imposes a rigorous duty on trustees
to behave "prudently" when investing trust assets. 7 1 As prudent investors, trustees are "to observe how men of prudence, discretion and
intelligence manage their own affairs, not in regard to speculation,
but in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering
the probable income, as well as the probable safety of the capital to be
invested."72 Under this rule, courts are supposed to judge prudence
ex ante as opposed to ex post. As Professor Rachlinski has articulated,
however, the truth is that "[t] he law governing the liability of trustees
for improperly investing trust assets is best described as an instance of
67
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courts falling prey to the hindsight bias." 73 Courts have a pronounced
propensity to evaluate the prudence or imprudence of a trustee's investment decision on the basis of information that the trustee could
not have known at the time she made the decision. In trust litigation,
trustees who are sued because their investments turned sour and resulted in losses to the beneficiaries have the unenviable challenge of
starting out at the bottom of a deep hole.74
In trust litigation, the fiduciary schema often reinforces the hindsight bias. As I indicated earlier, the structural power imbalance in
the trustee-beneficiary relationship, in which the trustee is perceived
as inherently dominant, together with the difficulty of actually detecting abuses of power, leads judges to draw inferences against trustees in doubtful cases. That tendency strengthens the hindsight bias by
prompting legal decision makers to conclude that information they
gained ex post was readily available ex ante.
The effects of the hindsight bias in turn reinforce the fiduciary
schema so that the two cognitive phenomena confirm each other. A
recent case involving alleged trustee imprudence illustrates this mutually reinforcing operation. In FirstAlabama Bank v. Martin,75 the court
held that the trustee's sale of certain stocks from a large and diversified common trust fund was imprudent because he sold the stocks "at
the bottom of the market." 76 The court initially acknowledged the
potential hindsight problem, but then immediately drew an inference
about the propriety of the sale's timing against the trustee. "It is true,"
the court stated, "that a trustee will not be held liable under ordinary
circumstances for losses due to unforeseen depression or recession of
the stock market. '77 In the next sentence, the court undermined its
acknowledgment by implicitly relying on a presumption that the
trustee had abused his position: 'Yet, where the course of dealing of
78
the trustee is such that it causes the loss, a trustee will be liable."
This statement is problematic because it assumes the answer to the
very question before the court: Should the court attribute the cause of
the loss to the trustee's decision? This causal attribution effectively
means that in cases of doubt the court will draw an inference against
the trustee. Information that the trustee did not have available ex
ante but gained ex post supports the inference.
73
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Some commentators have viewed Martinas an exceptional case of
judicial "backwardness and irrationality" in the law of trust investments. 79 Admittedly, Martin is a particularly extreme instance of cognitive error affecting causal attribution, but it is not an isolated
example of this problem. Other recent cases reflect the combined
effect of the fiduciary role-schema's causal inference and the hindsight bias. In Millikan v. Hughes (In re Estate of Collins),8 0 for example,
the appellate court reversed the trial court's finding that the trustees
"exercised the judgment and care under the circumstances then prevailing expected of men of prudence."8 ' Here, the trustee imprudently loaned $50,000 to a builder where the loan was secured by a
second mortgage on a parcel of unimproved land.8 2 The investment
soured when the builder went bankrupt and the holder of the first
mortgage foreclosed.8 3 The first mortgage was worth $90,000, and
two years prior to the trustees' investment the owners sold the property for $107,000.84 The appellate court concluded that the trustees
had "left an inadequate margin of safety."8 5 The court acknowledged
that at the time the trustee made the loan, construction industry in
the area was "enjoying boom times, although the bubble was to burst
just a few months later."8 6 While the trustees did not have the parcel
appraised, they did obtain the opinions of two real estate brokers regarding real estate values in the vicinity. The brokers informed the
trustees that property in that area was selling for between $18,000 and
$20,000 per acre. At those prices, the parcel in question was worth
between $170,000 and $187,000.87
The court dismissed the evidence of valuation with the remark
that "any assumption that the property was worth about $185,000and therefore the $140,000 in loans were well-secured-would have
been little more than a guess." 8 In reality, any method of valuing real
estate other than actual sale involves some degree of guesswork. The
trustees were acting on the basis of current information provided by
professionals who were familiar with current land values in the relevant locality. They were hardly in a position to realize or anticipate
what the court later knew-that the bottom was about to drop out of
the real estate market. The influence of hindsight bias on the court is
79

Bmws LONGSTRETH, MODERN INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AND THE PRUDENT MAN

RULE 18 (1986).
80
139 Cal. Rptr. 644 (Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
81 Id. at 649.
82 See id. at 647.
83
See id.

84

See id. at 649.

85

Id.

86

Id. at 647. (quoting the trial court).

87
88

See id.
Id. at 649.

20001

FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIPS

785

dear. The fiduciary schema's influence on the court's causal attribudon is also evident. The court gave no indication of how the trustees
could have known at the time they acted that the margin of safety was
"inadequate." In truth, the adequacy or inadequacy of the margin of
safety, judged ex ante, is more a matter of judgment than of fact.
Even though the trustees presented at least some evidence to sustain
their judgment call, the court attributed them with the loss. In doing
so, the court relied on a presumption of imposing causal responsibility on the fiduciary. The fact that the court employed such a presumption does not necessarily mean that the case was wrongly
decided. Indeed, other factors in the case might make the court's
decision understandable. The point is that a considerable part of the
court's reasoning exemplifies what I have called top-down causal reasoning. That reasoning, together with the effect of the hindsight bias,
placed the trustees in considerable jeopardy from the very outset.
The moral that courts seem to have gleaned from these cases is
that "when in doubt, hold the trustees liable." The knowledge about
fiduciaries that courts take with them as they approach an allegation
of fiduciary misconduct, combined with the influence of post hoc information, exposes trustees to a high level of risk of liability. Trustees
are probably not the only professionals in this unenviable position.
Physicians, especially certain specialists, likely face the same problem
for similar reasons. Future research applying cognitive theory to legal
decision making will surely be needed to confirm or deny the ideas I
have presented in this Essay.
CONCLUSION

My goal in this Essay has been to suggest a sense in which at least
some types of fiduciary relationships differ from ordinary contracts. I
do not argue that courts always hold trustees and executors liable for
beneficiary losses. Not all courts fall prey to cognitive errors when
dealing with claims against fiduciaries. Sometimes, the analysis is
more data-driven and leads to accurate decisions. Yet, cognitive error
likely creeps into judicial analysis in contract cases as well as fiduciary
cases. Still, judicial behavior and reasoning are, under my hypothesis,
characteristically different in the two contexts. While my hypothesis
requires further empirical testing, I posit that distinctive role schemas
and related aspects of knowledge structures are at work in fiduciary
litigation and create a greater risk of judicial error in that context
than in an ordinary contracting scenario.

